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Conversions are the byproduct of a profound transformation in American health care – 
the transfer from public to private, from nonprofit to for-profit enterprise – an equity shift 
that has resulted in the largest and fastest transfer of charitable assets in history. 
- Mark Dowie1
 
In the decade since President Clinton sought to secure health insurance for all 
Americans, coverage has generally moved in the opposite direction intended by the 
president and underlying public opinion.  
      - Thomas R. Oliver and Jason Gerson2
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent news about our health care system should convince anyone that the US is in the throes of 
a health care crisis.  Health care costs are in their fourth consecutive year of double-digit 
increases and are expected to rise 22% next year.3  Health insurance costs have been rising 
rapidly in recent years:  Costs for employers are expected to rise 16% this year, and double-digit 
increases will probably continue through much of the decade, as the population ages and the 
demand for prescription drugs and expensive tests and specialists increases.4
 
The average premium that workers pay for family coverage has jumped nearly 50% in only three 
years, to $201 per month.5  The average worker will spend $2,412 in premiums for family 
coverage, up 49% since 2000.6  Out-of-pocket expenses such as deductibles and copayments for 
drugs are up even more sharply over the same period, and have more than doubled over the past 
five years for employees of large companies.7  44% of large companies now tack on a separate 
deductible for each hospital admission.  Many small business are instituting even more draconian 
cuts or dropping coverage altogether – only 65% of companies with fewer than 200 employees 
offered coverage this year.8
 
Even in large firms, which are far more likely than small ones to offer health coverage, the 
number of uninsured workers has increased sharply over the past 15 years.  As of 2001, 9.6 
million Americans – 26% of the nation’s total uninsured – worked for or were dependents of 
employees of large firms, an increase of more than 50% since 1987.9  Uninsured workers in large 
businesses, like all uninsured Americans, are disproportionately low income, and low-income 
workers (those below 200% of poverty) are three times more likely than middle- or high-income 
                                                 
1 Dowie, p. 82. 
2 Oliver and Gerson, p. 3. 
3 Freudenheim. 
4 “Get Used to the Pain:  Another Round of Double-Digit Hikes in Health-Care Costs Is in the Mail,” p. 42. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p. 43. 
7 Ibid.; and Freudenheim. 
8 “Get Used to the Pain:  Another Round of Double-Digit Hikes in Health-Care Costs Is in the Mail,” pp. 42-43; and 
“Number of Uninsured Workers in Large Firms Up Sharply.” 
9 Glied, Lambrew, and Little, p. vii. 
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 workers to be uninsured.10  Nearly half – 46% of low-income workers are uninsured for some 
time during the year.11   
 
Even during the late 1990s, despite a strong economy and tight labor market, the proportion of 
the nonelderly population insured through employer-sponsored health plans decreased; 
workforce changes since then, such as stagnant wage growth and the nationwide declines in 
manufacturing jobs and unionization rates, have contributed to the trend, as have stricter 
insurance policies.12  Workers have been forced to shoulder larger proportions of health 
insurance costs, access to health insurance for part-time workers has declined, the use of 
contingent workers has increased, waiting periods have increased, the gap between skilled and 
unskilled wages has increased, and public insurance coverage has decreased as an effect of 
welfare reform.13   
 
Insurers, increasingly focused on the bottom line, have been tightening guidelines, moving out of 
unprofitable markets, and raising prices.  Private employer-sponsored insurance rates are rising 
at more than three times the rate at which medical-care inflation is rising.14  Health insurers, 
focused on rebuilding profits after a price war in the late 1990s, are prospering; Aetna, for 
example, expects to earn $900 million in operating profits this year.15  While they will likely 
raise their premiums less next year, experts say that the increase will still be in the double 
digits.16
 
Medicaid, the health program for 51 million Americans, has been squeezed by states faced with a 
third consecutive year of fiscal distress.  Twenty-five states have restricted eligibility, 18 have 
reduced benefits, and 17 have increased copayments.  Five states reduced and 36 froze payment 
rates for doctors; and nine states reduced and 22 froze payments to hospitals.  At the same time, 
rising unemployment and a sluggish economy have reduced income for millions, increasing the 
number of people eligible for Medicaid, which has also seen an increase in enrollment of the 
elderly and the disabled.  Doctors complain that Medicaid pays them less than most other 
insurers, and many refuse to take Medicaid.17     
 
Primarily because of the booming cost of prescription drugs, Medicare covers a smaller portion 
of health care expenses than at any time since the program was established in 1965.  The elderly 
spent 22% of their median income for health care last year – a greater proportion of their income 
than the 20% they spent before the advent of the program.18
 
                                                 
10 Ibid., pp. 4, 16. 
11 Ibid., p. 4. 
12 Ibid., p. 9; and Oliver and Gerson, p. 6. 
13 Glied, Lambrew, and Little., p. 14; and Oliver and Gerson, p. 6. 
14 “Why Your Premiums Are Still on the Rise.” 
15 “Get Used to the Pain,” p. 42. 
16 “Why Your Premiums Are Still on the Rise.” 
17 Pear. 
18 Freudenheim. 
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 The number of uninsured Americans is at an all-time high at 43.6 million, up 2.4 million since 
last year and nearly 4 million (a 10% jump) in the past two years.19  Certain populations are 
especially at risk of being uninsured:  28.1% of young adults, 30.7% of the poor, 33.2% of 
Hispanics, 19% of blacks, and 8.2% of Asian and Pacific Islanders were uninsured in 2001; by 
contrast, 11.7% of children, 10% of non-Hispanic whites, and .8% of adults 65 and older were 
uninsured.20
 
With the devolution of responsibility for health care from the federal government to states comes 
considerable variation in insurance coverage across states.  In 2001, the percentages of uninsured 
ranged from about 7% in Rhode Island and Minnesota to about 23% in Texas and New 
Mexico.21  
 
Billions of dollars in uninsured people’s health costs have historically been absorbed by 
nonprofit hospitals and insurers and federal programs, but the health care landscape is changing 
in ways that highlight the fragility of health care systems, raise questions about health care 
institutions’ accountability, and affect all community members, particularly low-income people, 
the uninsured, and those covered by Medicaid.  Aggressive competition by for-profit providers, 
together with industry-wide pressure to reduce costs, is reshaping local delivery systems as what 
was once a system comprised almost exclusively of nonprofit institutions and providers has 
become increasingly for-profit through conversion.  Over the past two decades, many nonprofit 
health care organizations have sought to strengthen their market positions and gain access to 
capital by becoming for-profit companies, either by corporate restructuring or by transferring 
assets through sales, mergers, or joint ventures.   
 
THE CONVERSION TREND 
 
The phenomenon of nonprofit to for-profit conversion in the health industry represents the 
largest redeployment of charitable assets in history.22  Because the converting nonprofit health 
organization is presumed to have provided public benefit before the conversion and because the 
nonprofit assets have been built by and on behalf of the public, state laws typically require that 
converting organizations preserve their charitable assets in order to maintain the level of public 
benefit provided before the conversion.  Often these assets are used to endow a new foundation.  
These foundations – commonly called conversion foundations – are the subject of this paper.  
Over the past two decades, billions of dollars in charitable assets have transferred from the health 
care industry into organized philanthropy, and billions more will no doubt do so.   
 
The trend of health conversions is a very recent but quickly accelerating one:  The first 
conversion foundation was created in 1973, and over the next ten years, only four were created; 
most were established in the mid-1980s or mid- to late 1990s.  Most are fewer than ten years old:  
59% were formed between 1994 and 1999, and an additional 11% since 1999.23
                                                 
19 “Get Used to the Pain:  Another Round of Double-Digit Hikes in Health-Care Costs Is in the Mail.”, pp. 42-43; 
and “Number of Uninsured Workers in Large Firms Up Sharply.”  
20 Oliver and Gerson, p. 5. 
21 Ibid., p. 6. 
22 “Health Care Conversion Foundations:  Regulation, Impacts, and Unanswered Questions.”  
23 Shiroma, p. 2. 
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According to Grant Makers in Health, as of May 2003, there are more than 165 new health 
foundations (several were too new to participate in the survey and are not included in this 
figure).  There were 148 in 2002.  Total assets of the 165 are just over $16.4 billion, up from 
$15.3 billion in 2002; assets of individual foundations range from $1.56 million to $2.89 billion; 
and the median is $46.5 million.24   
 
The following summary, which does not include the latest two years’ figures, nevertheless gives 
a sense of the growth of conversion foundations25: 
 
Year of 
Conversion Number 
 Total 
Assets*  
Mean 
Assets* 
1973 1 $        30.7 $        30.7 
1977 1 47.0 47.0
1981 1 2.3 2.3
1983 1 18.5 18.5
1984 12 504.6 0.0
1985 5 1,043.8 208.8
1986 4 147.7 36.9
1987 3 178.7 59.5
1988 1 18.7 18.7
1989 1 9.0 9.0
1990 2 180.8 90.4
1991 1 96.3 96.3
1992 3 1,064.7 354.9
1993 2 81.6 40.8
1994 11 994.6 90.4
1995 24 2,517.9 104.9
1996 21 5,521.2 262.9
1997 18 621.8 34.5
1998 12 1,267.2 105.6
1999 9 495.5 55.1
2000 4 288.7 72.2
2001 2 148.5 74.3
Total 139 $15,279.8 $109.9
* in millions 
 
Conversions of hospitals account for 68% of the 165 conversion foundations now in existence, 
conversions from health plans for 18%, and conversions from health systems for 8%.  Most 
(52%) are public charities; 43% are private foundations, and the rest are either social welfare 
organizations or have funds controlled by local governments.  They operate in 38 states; more 
than half (61%) are located in ten states.  Most dedicate some or all of their grant making to 
health, human services, or other health-related areas.26
                                                 
24 “A Profile of New Health Foundations,” p. 3. 
25 “Findings from the 2001 Survey of New Health Foundations.” 
26 “Findings from the 2001 Survey of New Health Foundations.” 
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One can get a fuller sense of the magnitude of the conversion trend – and the number of 
Americans it could affect – by looking at Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) conversions.  
Historically nonprofit entities, BCBS plans in 1997 insured 68.6 million people in 50 states.  At 
the same time, BCBS plans in 32 states were undergoing or planning to undergo restructuring, 
much of which is from nonprofit to for-profit health plans or mutual insurance companies.  And 
the number of health plan conversions is growing relative to the number of conversions of other 
types of organizations.27    
 
About 15% of 5,200 hospitals in the US are for-profit; the rest, with an estimated asset value of 
almost $200 billion, are potential conversion candidates.  The net worth of nonprofit health 
insurers, including the unconverted Blues, is about $92 billion – close to the asset value of all 
existing private foundations.28  
 
As cost containment and other competitive pressures fuel further health industry restructuring, 
the number of new health conversion foundations will surely grow.  Because of the magnitude of 
the changes taking place and the important questions conversion raises about the fragile nature of 
our health system and the absence of public accountability of health care institutions, the 
conversion trend has been attracting considerable public attention.   
 
Cy Pres Doctrine and Public Benefit 
 
The legal doctrine known as cy pres (from the Norman French phrase cy pres comme possible, 
meaning “as near as possible”) requires that the assets of a charitable organization forever be 
used for a purpose as close as possible to the organization’s original charitable mission when the 
charity’s original purpose becomes impractical, unlawful, or impossible.  Federal and most state 
laws require that the value of assets remain in the charitable stream, although application of the 
cy pres doctrine varies from state to state.   
 
The mere fact of being a nonprofit does not guarantee that a hospital, HMO, or insurer actually 
provides community benefits such as offering policies to high-risk individuals, providing 
coverage to small business employees, offering premium discounts for low-income subscribers, 
providing free health screenings and flu shots.  Until recently, it was left to health care 
institutions to decide how much money to devote to community benefits and what benefits to 
provide.   In many states, BCBS insurers, for example, have operated in manners that are almost 
indistinguishable from those of their for-profit competitors.   
 
Generally speaking, though, nonprofits and for-profits behave in fundamentally different ways 
and many, if not most, nonprofit hospitals and insurers have provided substantial community 
benefits, and in many communities they provide the only access to health care for vulnerable 
populations.  Hospitals in particular provide services and access in response to community need, 
and profits are invested back into the community through expanded service.  They are 
                                                 
27 Seto, Collins, and Weiskopf, p. 12. 
28 Dowie, p. 83. 
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 community-owned institutions and are the products of substantial community investment in 
terms of charitable contributions, foregone taxes, and volunteer time.   
 
Aside from the effects on community benefits for vulnerable populations, restructuring will 
ultimately affect access to health care for all members of a community given that hospital 
conversion often results in cuts in staffing, discontinued services, longer travel times, or hospital 
closures.  Not only have nonprofit hospitals provided greater breadth of services and the majority 
of care for chronic illnesses and indigent populations, but they have historically provided the vast 
majority of teaching, research, education, and technological development.  Investor-owned 
hospitals look different by virtue of ownership, structure, and accountability, and investor 
interests are not the same as community interests.  Consumers Union has questioned whether 
unprofitable services such as trauma and prenatal care remain in place when a conversion 
happens.   
 
While conversions constitute a threat to community benefits, the public scrutiny now being cast 
on conversion transactions can create many opportunities for consumers, consumer advocates, 
and communities protect those benefits.  To the extent that communities have a voice in the 
allocation of community resources, engage in public debate about the transformations in the 
field, and participate in shaping public health policy, resources can be protected and dedicated to 
charitable health care and increased access to health care for all. 
 
Many questions remain:  Do public assets remain devoted to the purpose for which nonprofit 
status was originally granted, and not redirected toward private gain? Will insurance be available 
to people not covered by other companies?  Will indigent patients be cared for?  Will teaching 
hospitals and health care research survive?  Will social equity be addressed?  Answers to these 
questions depend on increased attention on the part of many people, including citizens, advocacy 
groups, and state regulatory agencies, courts, and legislatures, as well as on the effectiveness of 
conversion foundations themselves. 
 
The Foundations 
 
The term “conversion foundation” does not begin to suggest the great diversity of organizations 
that result from conversion transactions.  The smallest has assets of about $1.5 million; the 
largest, nearly $3 billion; several conversion foundations are among the 50 largest foundations 
overall.29  There is also considerable diversity in tax status choices and foundation structures.   
 
Conversion foundations have no separate legal or tax category either.  Most are private 
foundations or public charities, but a growing number are social welfare organizations.  There 
are 86 public charities, 71 private foundations, six social welfare organizations, and two in which 
funds are administered or controlled by local government agencies.30  Most –112 – were created 
by hospital conversions; 29 by health plan conversions, 13 by health system conversions; several 
by conversions of more than one type of health care organization; and several by conversions of 
organizations such as rehabilitation centers, nursing homes, and blood banks.31
                                                 
29 “A Profile of New Health Foundations.” 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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Most have health-related missions, from narrow definitions of health to broad, including 
prevention, community wellness, strategic engagement, and systemic change for poor and 
marginalized people.  In 2001, though, 18% of the 139 conversion foundations then existing 
made less than 50% of their grants in health, and two made no health grants at all.32  A few are 
operating foundations with limited grant making.33   
 
Commonly funded areas include delivery of services, child and adolescent health, and health 
education and prevention.  Some focus on specific populations, such as the elderly, minorities, or 
children.  Access to care, mental health, substance abuse, racial and ethnic disparities in health, 
the weakened public health system, and the uninsured are beginning to attract more conversion 
foundation funding, and they are taking a leadership role in addressing these issues.34  Most 
focus within specific geographic limits, and some give statewide.   
 
Mark Dowie calls conversion foundations some of “the most exciting players in health 
philanthropy.  Not only do they fund long-neglected areas like health promotion, disease 
prevention, and public health, but they are also increasingly directed by trustees they serve rather 
than by overnight millionaires and the managers of new for-profit entities (as earlier conversions 
were)….  [Most are] better informed, more imaginative, and more responsive to community 
needs than traditional health foundations.”35  Most, according to Grant Makers in Health, involve 
the community in the development and ongoing operation of the foundations.36
 
Protecting the Public Interest:  Some Stories 
 
The relative secrecy surrounding many early conversion transactions has led to a good deal of 
controversy about how nonprofit assets are valued and what was done with them – as have 
revelations about cases of private inurement; conflicts of interest involving trustees and grantees; 
boards stacked with the directors from the newly converted for-profit entity; board members with 
no grant-making experience; lavish spending on trustee meetings, compensation, and offices; 
grant making to for-profit corporate health care companies and consultants; and grant making 
with no health benefit.  Even in a number of cases in which the foundation created by the 
conversion has gone on to include community input and to make significant commitments to 
health care for vulnerable groups, the earlier stages of the transaction have been characterized 
many of these same problems and by years of legal and political wrangling.  
 
                                                 
32 “Findings from the 2001 Survey of New Health Foundations.” 
33 Ibid. 
34 “Findings from the 2001 Survey of New Health Foundations.” 
35 Dowie, pp. 82-83. 
36 “Findings from the 2001 Survey of New Health Foundations.” 
 7
 THE IMPORTANCE OF VALUATION 
 
Greater Delaware Valley Health Care Center 
In 1984, three top officials of the Greater Delaware Valley Health Care Center in Pennsylvania brought 
the center from its nonprofit owner for $100,000.  State regulators required that the new owners pay the 
purchase price to other nonprofit health facilities in the area.  Two years later, the owners sold the for-
profit company on the open market for $20 million.   
 
The following year, the owners bought Group Health of St. Louis, a nonprofit HMO, for $4 million and 
issued themselves stock valued at thirty-three cents a share.  They donated the $4 million to charitable 
organizations providing health care in the St. Louis area.  A year later, a quarter of the new company’s 
stock was sold for $10 million ($14.28 a share, almost forty-five times the original price).   
 
The California Wellness Foundation 
In 1991, HealthNet, a 900,000-member HMO in California, decided to convert and valued itself at $104 
million.  Consumers Union said that this was not nearly enough and persuaded state regulators to increase 
the price to $300 million plus 80% of the stock in the new for-profit company.  The California Wellness 
Foundation is now worth almost a billion dollars.
 
In 1992, 20% of the stock in the new entity was bought for $1.5 million by 33 executives.  Four years 
later, their shares were worth more than $300 million.  Former HealthNet CEO Roger Greaves’ $300,000 
investment grew to more than $30 million – a 10,000% gain.  
 
---------- 
Mark Dowie, American Foundations:  An Investigative History, pp. 81-82, 85. 
 
 
Davies Medical Center, San Francisco: 
A Case of Private Inurement 
 
Gregory Monardo succeeded his father running Davies Medical Center, a small nonprofit San Francisco 
hospital.  Monardo’s salary was paid by Franklin Holding Corp., a private foundation that owned the 
hospital.  Payments to Monardo grew from $312,000 in 1995 to $470,000 in 1997, while Davies Medical 
Center struggled to compete with larger hospitals. 
 
Franklin Holding sold the medical center to a health care company for $29 million in 1998.  Monardo 
took home $3.5 million from the foundation that year; it was two years before the state attorney general 
would begin to routinely review transactions involving sales of nonprofit hospitals.  Two trustees of 
Davies Medical Center say that they do not recall voting on the $3.5 million payout.  Monardo also took a 
$350,000 home loan from Franklin Holding in 1988, despite the fact that personal loans to foundation 
trustees are not permitted by the IRS. 
 
Monardo still runs Franklin Holding (as of October 9, 2003), where he was paid $47,000 a year in 2001 
for four hours of work per week.  He also runs a new foundation that was created after the hospital sale.  
Franklin Holding had $24 million in assets in 2001, and has recently made grants to the new foundation 
and a number of Texas causes, including the Junior League of San Antonio, home of a trustee of both 
foundations who was on the Davies hospital board at the time of the sale.  
 
---------- 
Beth Healy, “Foundation’s Sale of Nonprofit Hospital a Windfall for One Trustee.”  
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 BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD CONVERSIONS: 
A RANGE OF USES FOR THE PROCEEDS 
 
California:  WellPoint Health Networks converted in 1996, creating two foundations whose assets now 
total more than $4 billion.  The California HealthCare Foundation conducts health policy research related 
to California; the California Endowment makes grants to charitable organizations in the state. 
 
Kentucky:  Legislators created the Foundation for a Healthy Kentucky as well as a separate private 
foundation that will accept assets from future conversions.   
 
New York:  The state is using 95% of the money from Empire BlueCross BlueShield’s conversion – 
more than $950 million – to fund a three-year salary increase for health care workers.  5% will be used to 
establish a small foundation dedicated to expanding access to health coverage.  The legislation was not 
made available for public review or comment, and was passed at 4:30 in the morning. 
 
Virginia:  No foundation was created; assets from the conversion of Trigon Healthcare went directly into 
the state’s coffers. 
 
Wisconsin:  A foundation was created to transfer funds to two medical schools; 65% of the money is to 
be used for medical research and education, the remaining 35% for public health initiatives. 
 
---------- 
“Charitable Foundations Formed by Conversions Take Many Forms.”  
 
“FYI:  Health Institution Transactions Report,” May 2002.   
 
 
The Foundation for a Healthy Kentucky: 
Years of Legal Wrangling Produces a Foundation 
 
In 1993, Kentucky BCBS (BCBSKY) merged with Anthem Insurance Companies Inc., a for-profit 
mutual insurance company.  The deal was approved, without consideration of BCBSKY’s charitable 
assets, by the state department of insurance.  Kentucky had not yet enacted any statutes to regulate 
nonprofit conversions and protect charitable assets. 
 
In 1996, after a routine investigation raised questions about Anthem’s use of reserves, Department of 
Insurance Commissioner George Nichols asked state Attorney General Albert Chandler to audit the 
merger.  In March 1997, Anthem sued the AG and the insurance commissioner, charging that the 
investigation exceeded their scope of authority, but the agencies relied on the common law power of the 
courts to impose provisions to protect charitable trusts. 
 
In October of that year, Chandler, supported by a coalition of local consumer groups called Kentuckians 
for Health Care Reform, in turn filed suit against Anthem, seeking to recover millions of dollars in 
charitable assets that Anthem had converted to its own for-profit use and to reimburse policy holders for 
premium increases that violated the Consumer Protection Act.  Anthem launched a PR campaign against 
Chandler’s lawsuit and the consumer groups, threatening higher premiums and less financial security if 
the AG prevailed.  In March 1998, the commissioner of insurance ruled that Anthem conducted a “highly 
misleading” campaign, but took no action. 
 
In the Spring of 1998, a trial court dismissed the AG’s Consumer Protection Act claims, but a year later, a 
unanimous appellate court reversed the dismissal and ruled that the AG should have the opportunity to 
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 investigate and bring to trial the consumer protection claims against Anthem.  Anthem filed motion for 
summary judgment asking the trial court to dismiss charitable trust claims without a trial, a motion 
Chandler opposed.  Consumer groups filed three amici curiae supporting the AG; Anthem opposed the 
briefs and asked the judge not to consider them, but in November, the judge ruled against Anthem, 
accepting all three briefs.  In March 1999, the court heard Anthem’s motion for summary judgment, and 
in May denied it, allowing the case to proceed.  The attorney general would therefore have the 
opportunity to prove that BCBSKY had held charitable assets and to determine the value of those assets. 
 
At the end of 1999, Chandler and Anthem announced settlement of the charitable trust issue.  Anthem 
agreed to place $45 million that had accumulated prior to sale into a newly created foundation that would 
be used to fund unmet health care needs of Kentuckians.  An advisory board was to be appointed by the 
Franklin Circuit Court on the nomination of the AG and was to make recommendations to the court about 
the structure and composition of the new foundation. 
 
In February 2000, members of the Kentucky General Assembly began a legislative effort to challenge the 
enforcement authority of the AG and the court’s jurisdiction over the charitable assets.  HB 629 provided 
that the $45 million would be subject to governmental controls and, in effect, made the foundation a 
quasi-governmental entity.  The bill stipulated that all future charitable assets from similar settlements 
pursued by the AG as well as public assets obtained through class action suits would be placed under the 
control of a newly created governmental entity called the Charitable Asset Administration Board.  A 
provision was included that prohibited any state public official, including the AG, from challenging the 
constitutionality of the legislation.  More than 40 groups, including state and national consumer 
advocates, state community foundations, and the National Council for Responsive Philanthropy, launched 
a campaign to urge Governor Patton to veto the legislation.  The editorial pages of the Lexington Herald-
Leader and the Louisville Courier-Journal also urged him to veto.  But HB 629 was passed by both 
houses and signed into law by the governor in April 2000.   
 
In September 2000, Governor Patton appointed the 34-member Charitable Health Care Trust Advisory 
Committee.  Meant to be diverse both geographically and demographically, the committee includes 
individuals from universities, provider groups, businesses, philanthropies, and consumer groups that were 
involved in the fight to preserve the charitable assets that were almost lost during the merger.  It was the 
committee’s task to establish a foundation.  After several meetings to discuss key elements of the 
structure and composition of the foundation, the committee approved the articles of incorporation and by-
laws.  Early in 2001, the Franklin Circuit Court approved the articles of incorporation and by-laws to 
establish the Foundation for a Healthy Kentucky, a public charity.   
 
The foundation has a community advisory committee, a 31-member committee of state residents who 
advise the board and serve as a link between the foundation and the public.  Two of the foundation’s 15 
directors are appointed by the governor; one is appointed by Anthem (and cannot be an employee of 
Anthem); 12 are elected and are composed of seven representative directors (who represent the state 
supreme court districts) and five at-large directors.  Any state resident can make nominations; a 
nominating committee elected by the community advisory committee reviews all nominations received 
and narrows the list to a slate of candidates for review and endorsement by the community advisory 
committee. The community advisory committee in turn presents a slate of two candidates per vacancy to 
the board, which elects members. 
 
---------- 
“Conversion and Preservation of Charitable Assets of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans:  How States Have Protected or Failed to 
Protect the Public Interest.”  
 
“FYI:  Health Institution Transactions Report,” April 30, 2001.   
 
http://www.healthyky.org. 
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CAREFIRST BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD IN MARYLAND: 
A DEAL FALLS THROUGH AND A FOUNDATION CLOSES 
 
In January 2002, CareFirst, the nonprofit holding company for the nonprofit Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
plans in Maryland, Delaware, and the District of Columbia, filed an application to convert to for-profit 
status and be acquired for $1.37 billion by WellPoint Health Networks, the owner of Blue Cross of 
California and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Georgia. 
 
Maryland Insurance Commissioner Steven Larsen, who has regulatory authority over insurance plan 
conversions, undertook a 14-month review process that, according to Community Catalyst, can serve as a 
model to other states.  The process included 15 days of hearings, eight opportunities for public comment 
held across Maryland, seven expert reports evaluating the proposal (he hired independent consultants to 
perform a comprehensive health impact study, valuation report, due diligence analysis, and review of 
CareFirst executives’ compensation packages), and review of more than 87,000 pages of documents.  The 
commissioner heard from more than 250 people during the public comment sessions and received more 
than 300 written comments from citizens.  He kept consumer advocacy coalitions updated on the progress 
of the review process and throughout the process, documents including transcripts, reports of experts, and 
written documents were posted on the department Web site.   
 
Maryland community coalitions, which had been preparing for the proposed conversion for almost a year 
before the application was filed, worked with coalitions in Delaware and DC as well.  They opposed the 
deal because of large compensation packages for CareFirst executives, lack of local control over the Blues 
plans, the purchase price valuation, and potential changes in service and premiums.  
 
The CareFirst proposal also provoked a flurry of legislation in the 2002 session of the Maryland General 
Assembly, some of which related to the charitable entity that would result from the conversion.  The 
Maryland Health Care Foundation had been created by the state legislature in 1997 to hold the assets of 
for-profit conversions of hospitals and health insurers and to use those funds to improve access to care for 
those who cannot afford it.  But members of the state legislature began to have doubts about turning over 
all of the $1 billion that would have gone to the foundation as a result of the CareFirst sale and amended 
the existing law to create a trust within the foundation called the Maryland Health Care Trust.  The trust 
would hold the money from the conversion and the legislature would control the charitable assets placed 
in the trust, exercising more control over the trust than it could over the foundation.  The plan was to use 
the money for public purposes such as covering people who cannot afford health insurance.   
 
The foundation had received $500,000 in start-up money from the state, almost $2 million in its first year 
from the conversion of a mental health plan, and a small portion – $3.5 million – of the state’s proceeds 
from the national tobacco settlement.  The foundation’s board, appointed by the governor, had a number 
of public officials as members.  The foundation provided funding to launch some programs, including 
Medbank, which distributes medications to people who cannot afford them, and a pediatric dental clinic 
in Carroll County. 
 
In March 2003, the insurance commissioner denied CareFirst’s proposal, finding it not in the public 
interest and citing the board’s failure to uphold the nonprofit mission.  He also cited as disqualifying 
factors a rigged auction for CareFirst that did not produce fair market value and management and board 
bonuses that constitute private inurement.  Other factors in his decision included failure to provide enough 
information to make a comprehensive health impact study possible; lack of board due diligence in 
deciding to convert, selecting the bidder, and negotiating terms and conditions of the transaction; failure 
to disclose conflicts of interest of officers, directors, and experts; and negative impact on the availability 
and affordability of health care in Maryland.  He also cited several issues related to the foundation: 
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  “Conversion Foundations have limited ability to make systemic changes or improvements.  They can 
impact specific communities or problems. 
 Maryland law creates a confusing governance structure for the disposition of conversion proceeds.  
Only the Legislature may spend conversion proceeds, and such spending shall be on efforts to 
improve ‘health status.’  The Foundation, however, is charged with addressing ‘access’ to health care.  
Programs to improve ‘health status’ may not address problems relating to ‘access’ that could arise 
from the transaction.” 
 
Following the decision, legislation was passed and signed into law recommitting CareFirst to its 
nonprofit, charitable mission, provoking a flurry of lawsuits:  The same day the governor signed the bill, 
the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association filed suit to terminate CareFirst’s license to use the BCBS 
trademark, arguing that the legislation constituted a state takeover of CareFirst, which violates BCBS 
Association licensing rules.  The state Attorney General in turn filed an injunction to stop the association, 
and CareFirst filed suit against the state arguing that the law is unconstitutional. 
 
The suits were combined and moved to federal district court in Baltimore, and settlement was reached 
restoring CareFirst’s license and amending the law so that fewer CareFirst board members would be 
replaced, executive pay would be comparable to other nonprofit executives, and banning conversion for 
five years.  In July 2003, the new insurance commissioner, Alfred Redmer, released a report outlining 
several state insurance law violations committed by CareFirst, including operating a nonprofit as a for-
profit, corporate mismanagement, board failure to carry out their fiduciary duties, and failure to retain 
independent consultants during the conversion.  The commissioner planned to issue civil charges against 
the company’s top management and board.  And most recently, the US Attorney’s office for Maryland, 
the FBI, and a federal grand jury have issued subpoenas to CareFirst, WellPoint, and the insurance 
administration as part of a federal investigation into possible mismanagement during the proposed 
conversion. 
 
While CareFirst had pointed to the $1 billion that would go to the foundation or other programs as a 
reason the state should approve the transaction, a consultant to the insurance commissioner questioned 
how control and accountability would be divided between the foundation, the trust, and the legislature.  
The foundation announced plans to close in October 2003, given a lack of funding.  
 
---------- 
“CareFirst Conversion to For-Profit Status and Sale.” 
  
“Conversion and/or Sale of a Non-Profit Health Services Plan:  An Explanation of the Process.”  
 
“FYI:  Health Institution Transactions Report,” September 7, 2001, May 2002, March 2003, and August 2003.  
 
“Maryland Insurance Commissioner Denies CareFirst Conversion and Sale,” press release dated March 5, 2003. 
 
“Proposed Conversion and the Legislative Response.” 
 
William M. Salganik, “Out of Cash:  A State Health Care Foundation That Was to be Financed through the Conversions of 
Nonprofit Hospitals and Insurers is Shutting Down.”  
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 BCBS MUTUAL OF OHIO: 
Public Scrutiny Stops a Sweetheart Deal 
 
In early 1996, Columbia-HCA Healthcare, the nation’s largest for-profit hospital chain, announced plans 
to form a joint venture with BCBS Mutual of Ohio, the state’s largest nonprofit health insurer.  The Blues 
proposed to sell 85% of their assets to Columbia for $299.5 million, $19 million of which would go to 
BCBS executives, trustees, attorneys, and for concluding noncompetition agreements.  Policy holders 
sued against the deal, the state attorney general opposed it, and the national BCBS association revoked the 
Ohio organization’s license.  A federal judge ruled that the new entity could not use the Blue Cross or 
Blue Shield trademarks, and the state department of insurance rejected the merger.  
 
---------- 
Mark Dowie, American Foundations:  An Investigative History, p. 85. 
 
 
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF WISCONSIN: 
PUBLIC INPUT HAS LIMITED EFFECT 
 
Rumors of a conversion by Blue Cross Blue Shield United of Wisconsin (BCBSUW) began circulating in 
1998, and community groups throughout the state called for caution, urged regulators and BCBSUW to 
determine the full fair market value of the health plan through an independent valuation, and 
recommended that regulators hold public hearings to determine how the money should be used.  
 
But in June 1999, BCBSUW announced conversion plans that included “donation” of $250 million to the 
Medical College of Wisconsin and the University of Wisconsin Medical School (which trains about half 
the state’s physicians).  Governor Tommy Thompson and AG James Doyle supported the deal, and the 
proposal was filed with the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI) for review.  Community 
coalitions argued that the assets belonged to the community, not to BCBSUW executives, and that the 
assets were not the executives’ to donate.   
 
In response to consumer groups’ concerns, Commissioner of Insurance Connie O’Connell required that 
35% of the funds be used by the medical schools for public health, but also allowed a committee to 
change and even eliminate the allocation by a two-thirds vote.  Consumer advocates filed suit to block the 
proposal, arguing that the law required the money to go to an independent foundation.  
 
Public hearings were held for a year, during which BCBSUW argued that it was not and had never been a 
charity and thus was not subject to the law of charitable trust, even though state law had deemed nonprofit 
health plans to be charitable and benevolent corporations for much of BCBSUW’s history.  O’Connell 
appointed a three-member appraisal committee to help examine the conversion proposal; committee 
members were the executive director of the Wisconsin Investment Board, which managed investment for 
state assets; a certified public accountant and chair of the Insurance Committee of the Wisconsin Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants; and the state’s deputy commissioner of insurance.  The committee hired 
an investment banking firm to provide technical expertise to the agency and the committee on some of the 
financial aspects of the plan.  
 
The lawsuit ended up before a Dane County Circuit Court judge who ruled that the doctrines of charitable 
trust and cy pres do not apply to BCBSUW.  He ruled that the Wisconsin statute regulating health care 
conversions did not specifically incorporate the charitable trust and cy pres parts of the Wisconsin code, 
so the legislature did not intend these doctrines to apply to health care conversions; that the assets were 
not acquired with donative intent, but from premium payments from policy holders; that the state statute 
limits entities eligible to bring a cy pres action, and the community coalition was not among them; and 
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 that cy pres did not apply because the purpose of BCBSUW had not become impractical, unlawful, or 
impossible because BCBSUW would continue to operate as a health plan, albeit a for-profit one.  The 
judge also ruled that Wisconsin’s unique statutory scheme gave the insurance commissioner great 
discretion to approve the conversion plan, and that substantial evidence supported the commissioner’s 
decision.   
 
The commissioner’s March 2000 order approving the conversion did not place a definite value on the 
company.  Instead, O’Connell said:  “A determination of the current value of the stock will not be 
indicative of the dollar amount ultimately achieved.  For that reason the Appraisal Committee and my 
decision placed the focus on assuring [that] the definitive valuation event, when the first stock sale occurs, 
will produce a fair and reasonable result.”  The conversion date would coincide with the first stock sale, at 
which time a dollar amount would be determined. 
 
Saying that the resounding themes of the public input she received “were for funds to be made available 
for local and community public health initiatives, medical research and provider education and access,” 
O’Connell modified the conversion plan to provide greater public input into the use of the funds, establish 
independent foundation governance (by a board whose original members would be appointed by the 
commissioner), ensure full and fair valuation, and earmark 35% of the conversion proceeds to address 
public health needs in collaboration with community organizations.  She added, “The existing 
infrastructure and public nature of the medical schools, board of regents and board of trustees will result 
in the most efficient and effective use of the conversion funds.  With the added public participation and 
oversight for the use of these funds that is included in my decision, I am confident that the many health 
needs of the citizens of our State will receive proper consideration.”  The foundation, a 501(c)(4), exists 
only to provide a vehicle to realize the full value of BCBSUW and transfer those funds to the two medical 
schools.   
 
---------- 
“Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of Wisconsin United for Health Foundation, Inc.” 
 
“Amended and Restated Bylaws of Wisconsin United for Health Foundation, Inc.”   
 
“Appraisal Committee for Blue Cross Conversion Proposal Appointed.” 
 
“Blue Cross/Blue Shield News,” press releases dated August 22, 2002, and May 9, 2003.   
 
“FYI:  Health Institution Transactions Report,” April 30, 2001.   
 
“FYI:  Health Institution Transactions Report,” September 7, 2001 
 
Gorham, Barbara, and Nomita Ganguly, “Wisconsin Blue Cross Conversion:  $250 Million for Medical Schools,” pp. 10-12. 
 
“Insurance Commissioner Modifies and Approves Blue Cross and Blue Shield Conversion Plan.”  
 
Letter dated January 8, 2001, from Stephen E. Bablitch of BlueCross & BlueShield United of Wisconsin to Guenther Ruch of the 
Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of Insurance.  
 
“The Wisconsin Partnership Fund for a Health Future, 2003-2008 Five-Year Plan,” April 16, 2003.  
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 THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION AND OVERSIGHT 
 
Early conversions, which occurred with minimal government oversight or public watchdog 
activity, resulted in substantial undervaluation of assets of converting entities and foundations 
that were significantly smaller than they might have been if more rigorous standards of valuing 
assets were in place.  Government oversight and public scrutiny have increased greatly, but much 
more progress is needed.  Regulation is needed not only to be certain that assets are fully valued 
and transferred in their entirety to the conversion foundation, but to ensure that the resulting 
foundation remains faithful to the original purposes of the nonprofit corporation.  The 
effectiveness of conversion foundations depends on government oversight of and public input 
into their establishment and their work.   
 
Many state attorneys general have sought greater regulatory powers, and a number of state 
legislatures have passed laws governing conversion transactions.  Some states have also 
negotiated with for-profit buyers to provide specific levels of charity care or special services.  
The objectives of any government entity’s action and oversight should be safeguarding the value 
of the charitable assets, protecting the community from loss of essential health care services, and 
ensuring that the proceeds of the transaction are used for appropriate charitable purposes. 
 
Provisions for safeguarding the value of charitable assets should include independent review of 
the fairness of the transaction, disclosures of conflicts of interest, and development of a valuation 
report.  Provisions for protecting the community from loss of essential health care services 
should include development safeguards for continuing essential health care services, and public 
hearings or other solicitation of public comment.  Provisions for ensuring that the proceeds of the 
sale are used for appropriate charitable purposes should include ensuring that the sale proceeds 
are not used for the private benefit of the for-profit purchaser, determination of the charitable 
purposes for which the sale proceeds will be used, and governance and oversight of the nonprofit 
entity that receives the sale proceeds.37
 
There is a broad range of business combinations possible – including outright sale of a nonprofit 
entity to a for-profit buyer, merger and consolidation of nonprofit entities, merger of entities in 
noncontiguous states, joint ventures, and creation of mutual holding companies, to list a few – 
and each has different implications.  In some joint venture conversions, for example, only a 
portion of the asset value – as little as 50% – is paid at the time of conversion, and the balance is 
held as an interest in the new for-profit organization.38  It is therefore crucial that agencies 
construe conversion activity broadly in order to ensure that their regulations, laws, and decisions 
govern all activity likely to result in a change from nonprofit to for-profit status. 
 
State Regulators 
 
Responsibility for ensuring that the charity receives fair market value for the assets being 
converted, that the transaction is fair to the charity, and that there is no private inurement resides 
                                                 
37 “Proposed Guidelines for State Regulators’ Oversight of Sale and Joint Venture Transactions in which the Assets 
of Nonprofit Hospitals or HMOs are Transferred to For-Profit Enterprises.” 
38 “The Case for an Activist Approach by State Charity Regulators in Overseeing For-Profit Conversions of 
Nonprofit Hospitals and HMOs.” 
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 first with the state attorney general, who in many cases is the only party with standing and is 
therefore the sole representative of the community interest.  As can be seen in a number of the 
stories above, AGs are in many cases taking this responsibility and their leadership role very 
seriously, even stopping deals from taking place.   
 
Other regulatory agencies may also have responsibility, depending on the type of entity 
undergoing conversion.  In Wisconsin and Maryland, for example, state commissioners of 
insurance were the responsible parties in conversion of the state Blue Cross Blue Shields.  In 
California, HMOs and insurance plans are overseen by a state department of corporations; the 
attorney general oversees all other nonprofit corporations, including hospitals and health care 
facilities.  When responsibilities are split, those responsibilities should be clearly delineated and 
the agencies should work closely together to examine the transaction.   
 
National associations of regulators understand the importance of their members’ roles in 
conversion transactions and have taken action to protect the public interest.  The National 
Association of Attorneys General, for example, passed a resolution stating:  “the proposed uses 
of the proceeds of the transaction should be consistent with the charitable purpose for which the 
assets are held by the nonprofit health care entity,” has developed principles of oversight, and 
has written model legislation for hospital conversions.39  The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC), whose licensing agreements govern the Blue Cross Blue Shield 
trademark, has a BCBS conversion work group and has at times threatened to revoke plans’ use 
of the trademark.  NAIC also has 13 consumer representatives from the nonprofit advocacy 
community to ensure that consumers’ voices are heard in the organization.   
 
In overseeing conversion transactions, state charity regulators are also working with and 
providing leadership to other government agencies.  Some have taken the position that a 
nonprofit hospital, insurance plan, or other entity proposing to convert to for-profit status must 
obtain advance court approval in a cy pres-type proceeding.  In California, the Blue Cross 
conversion that resulted in creation of the California Endowment and the California HealthCare 
Foundation triggered a change in state law because of the leadership of the Commissioner of 
Corporations, who in 1994 reformed the departmental practice of undervaluing public assets in 
HMO conversions.  Before that, oversight had been lax and the department was widely viewed 
as allowing undervaluation of assets.  After the transaction was completed in 1996, the 
legislature passed a bill codifying the Department of Corporations standards used to review the 
conversion and enacted similar requirements of conversion of nonprofit hospitals.40
 
State Legislatures 
 
Recognizing the potential for negative community-wide effects of conversion transactions in the 
absence of public debate or input, states have responded legislatively, but there is a long way to 
go.  A flurry of legislation between 1995 and 1997 resulted in 19 states passing 21 laws, most of 
which clarified the public’s rights under existing charitable trust and nonprofit law.41  28 statues 
                                                 
39 Dowie, p. 84; and “The Sale and Conversion of Not-For-Profit Hospitals:  A State-by-State Analysis of New 
Legislation,” Introduction. 
40 Ferris and Graddy, pp. 16-17. 
41 Seto, Collins, and Weiskopf, p. 2. 
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 now have a conversion law that covers either nonprofit hospitals and insurers or both; 23 states 
(including DC) have laws governing hospital conversions, and ten (including DC) have laws 
governing HMO conversions.42
 
Most of the laws on the books define a process for state oversight and review that includes 
approval by the Attorney General and/or other state agencies, specify a time frame for 
notification and submission of information by the parties to the transaction, and define action by 
the state.  State laws vary greatly both in their application of cy pres doctrine to the proceeds and 
in involvement of the public; while many stipulate that the proceeds be used to support and 
promote health care in the community, only a few require that a public hearing be held as part of 
the decision, and some do not even require public disclosure of the transaction.43   
 
The following brief summary of some of the provisions in the laws that have been enacted to 
date gives some indication of how much more needs to be done to protect the public interest and 
prevent the kinds of problems that have hitherto plagued conversion transactions: 
 
 Regulator considers health impact:  17 states provide for consideration; 6 require  
 Require parties to transaction to analyze health impact:  6 states 
 Acquirers must submit a community benefit plan or maintain free care:  7 states, 
including DC  
 Consider acquirer’s commitment to providing free care:  5 states 
 Require monitoring of impact on health care:  7 states 
 Prohibit private inurement:  11 states 
 Consider private inurement:  9 states, including DC 
 Consider conflicts of interest between parties:  14 states, including DC 
 Consider conflicts of interest in patient referral:  5 states 
 Require regulator to obtain independent valuation of assets:  3 states, including DC 
 Require that public hearing be held:  10 states 
 Consumers have standing to appeal approval:  2 states, one of which only implies that 
consumers do 
 Require charitable set-aside:  22 states, including DC 
 Require foundation independence:  10 states, including DC44 
 
Some laws also grant explicit enforcement power to the regulators charged with overseeing 
conversion transactions.45  The strongest provisions give regulators the means not only to enforce 
the law during the conversion process, but also the means to enforce free care and community 
benefit agreements and to ensure that conversion foundations serve the public interest.46   
 
Only a handful of the new laws define conversion broadly enough to encompass a wide range of 
transactions.  Very few counteract the potential conflicts between the interests that the profit 
                                                 
42 “Conversions:  A Compendium of State Laws,” pp. 1-3; and “Conversion Model Act,” p. 1. 
43 “The Sale and Conversion of Not-For-Profit Hospitals:  A State-by-State Analysis of New Legislation,” Part I:  
Common Elements in Hospital Conversion Legislation. 
44 “Conversions:  A Compendium of State Laws,” pp. 4-8. 
45 Seto, Collins, and Weiskopf, pp. 2-3. 
46 Ibid., p. 17. 
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 motive introduces into hospital management and those of patients.  Very few make stipulations 
regarding the foundation created by the conversion, and even fewer look beyond such basic 
questions as independence or tax classification of the resulting entity. 
 
More – and more comprehensive – laws are needed to protect consumer interests throughout the 
conversion process, give consumers the opportunity to participate and speak out in a conversion, 
give regulators a direction and process for reviewing an extremely complicated transaction, and 
regulate the establishment and governance of the foundation and its charitable activities. 
 
The following general questions can be used to gauge the soundness of laws relating to 
conversions: 
 
 Protecting the community’s access to, and the quality of, health services: 
o Does the law require that regulators analyze the impact of the transaction on the 
community? 
o Can regulators withhold approval if the health impact is negative? 
o Is the acquiring party required to submit a community benefits plan that must 
meet regulatory approval? 
o Is the acquiring party required to make a commitment to free care? 
 Protecting charitable assets: 
o Was the nonprofit properly valued? 
o Was the money set aside for charitable purposes? 
o Was the community involved in those decisions? 
o Is community involvement mandated for the long term?47 
 
Laws should require: 
 that regulators conduct analysis of the impacts of the transaction on community health 
and local health delivery systems 
 that regulators withhold approval if health impacts are negative 
 that the acquiring party submit a community benefits plan that must meet with regulatory 
approval 
 that the acquiring party make a free care commitment  
 that public hearings be held in the affected community 
 establishment of criteria for making conversion filings public 
 independent valuation of charitable assets  
 that regulators monitor and enforce agreements and commitments  
 that regulators have enforcement mechanisms such as criminal and civil penalties and 
license revocation and denial 
 that the full value of the conversion be turned into a conversion foundation 
 that the resulting foundation be a 501(c)(3) or a public charity 
 that the resulting foundation be independent of the parties to the transaction, or at least 
from the for-profit acquirer 
 that the endowed foundation and its charitable activities not be viewed as fulfilling 
community benefit requirements imposed on the for-profit acquirer 
 that a regulator monitor the foundation and its activities after the transaction 
                                                 
47 “Health Care Conversions and Philanthropy:  Regulation, Impacts, and Unanswered Questions.” 
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  that the foundation have a particular mission or be limited in its grant-making priorities  
 that foundation governance be broadly based in the community served by the healthcare 
entity 
 that the foundation board be comprised of individuals with experience in pertinent areas 
such as foundations and health care 
 that the foundation board conduct a public hearing to solicit comments on the proposed 
mission statement, program agenda, corporate structure, and strategic planning (15-16) 
 that most of the foundation’s grant making be focused in the community served by the 
converting healthcare entity 
 that the foundation’s grant making emphasize vulnerable populations  
(Washington’s law, for example, stipulates that proceeds be used for “charitable health 
purposes consistent with the nonprofit corporation’s original purpose, including 
providing health care to the disadvantaged, the uninsured, and the underinsured, and 
providing benefits to promote improved health in the affected community.”   Maine’s law 
stipulates that the foundation’s mission “must include, but is not limited to, serving the 
state’s unmet health care needs, particularly with regard to medically uninsured and 
underserved populations and providing access to care and improving quality of care for 
those populations.”)48  
 
Courts  
 
As can be seen in the case stories above, much conversion activity has taken place in the courts, 
but more as a result of challenges to aspects of transactions than because of any systematic 
inclusion of the courts in the process.  Some regulators, though, are requiring that the converting 
entity obtain advance court approval in a cy pres-type proceeding.  Such involvement of the 
courts at particular points in the conversion process could help prevent so many contentious 
lawsuits and protect the public interest. 
 
The Importance of Ongoing Community Input  
 
Community groups have been increasingly involved in – and have had important effects on –
conversion transactions, providing input to regulators and others about asset and service 
preservation, about the community benefits plans required by some of the new laws, and, more 
recently, about the new health philanthropies.  
 
By the time a conversion transaction is approved, basic questions about the foundation’s 
structure and orientation are often complete.  Community groups should therefore not wait until 
the foundation begins to operate, but should be involved in these decisions during transaction 
negotiations and initial public review periods.  In early conversions, the responsibility for 
developing the foundation plan was often left to trustees of the converting nonprofit 
organization, but this approach did not adequately recognize the community stake in nonprofit 
assets or provide for broad input.  The people most directly affected by the conversion and 
targeted to benefit from the foundation’s activities were left out of the planning process entirely.  
More recently, particularly in highly visible cases, regulators and some new laws have 
                                                 
48 Seto, Collins, and Weiskopf, pp. 16-17. 
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 encouraged broader participation in early planning.   New Hampshire, for example, is requiring 
health insurance plans to convene community focus groups to determine the best use of 
foundation assets.49  
 
Some say that this is where community input should stop:  Gary L. Yates, President and CEO of 
The California Wellness Foundation (TCWF), and Thomas G. David, the Foundation’s 
Executive Vice President, agree that “conversions should receive careful scrutiny from a variety 
of stakeholders, including those who have the most difficulty obtaining access to health care – 
the uninsured and traditionally underserved,” and note that TCWF’s asset base is three times the 
original figure offered by the company largely because of public scrutiny of the transaction.  
TCWF, in fact, has made grants to Consumers Union to support its work in casting light on 
conversion deals.  But, they say, “the critical time for that input is before the conversion is 
approved.  Once the new philanthropic organization has been created, it should operate as does 
any other private foundation, with the trustees charged with the responsibility for good 
stewardship.”50
 
But planning for these foundations should have the same level of community oversight and input 
as the conversion transaction itself.  Because of the public nature of the source of assets, these 
foundations are different from most private foundations, which were established on the basis of 
personally amassed fortunes.  They are in essence public trusts and should be structured so that 
the public has a voice in their missions and governance.   
 
Choices about the structure, mission, and grant-making focus should be made through processes 
that encourage public dialogue, engage diverse elements of the community, and foster consensus 
about community health improvement goals.  It is essential to include community members with 
unmet health needs and their representatives in the foundation planning process.   
 
Many new conversion foundations have viewed as important the search to find ways to involve 
their communities in setting grant-making priorities, even though they are not required by law to 
do so.  A number of foundations require that board members be broadly representative of the 
community that is served, and some (such as the Foundation for a Healthy Kentucky, discussed 
above) are establishing community advisory committees as an accountability measure, to ensure 
community participation.  A community advisory committee can establish a “program of 
community outreach activities to assess community needs, encourage participation by 
communities and individuals that are intended to benefit from [the foundation’s] activities, and 
listen to, and obtain feedback from, members of the community about [the foundation’s] 
grantmaking goals and activities.”51  It can also function as a permanent nominating committee 
to the board for its selection of new board members.   
 
                                                 
49 “Charitable Foundations Formed by Conversions Take Many Forms.” 
50 Yates and David.  
51 “Model By Laws for 501(c)(3) Foundations,” p. 5. 
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 THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNITY INPUT 
 
The San Angelo, Texas community hospital was sold in 1995 to Columbia-HCA.  About $57 million 
went to a conversion foundation to benefit residents.  But by 2000 more than a quarter of the 102,000 
residents of the town had no health insurance and little access to health care, and many more were 
substantially underinsured.  Meanwhile, the San Angelo Health Foundation made a $200,000 grant for an 
alumni center at the state university and another $200,000 grant to establish a new animal shelter. 
 
---------- 
Annette Fuentes and Rosemary Metzler Lavan, No Health, No Weatlth.” 
 
The Role of Traditional Philanthropy 
 
The input of already established foundations in conversion transactions is also important for a 
number of reasons.  The issues at stake in conversions in many cases bear directly on the 
experience and work of established foundations, especially of those that are concerned about 
reduction in the capacity of the health and human services safety net.  Foundations can provide 
an informed perspective in public discussion about the changes taking place in the health care 
industry, and many of the questions that arise in the formation of new foundations are in areas 
where local foundations have direct experience and relevant expertise.  They have longstanding 
relationships with nonprofit health care organizations, and understand how limited funds can be 
used to achieve results.  Their participation is especially important given the limited experience 
many regulators have with nonprofit conversions.  Working with other community leaders and 
institutions, philanthropic leaders can contribute through such activities as: 
 
 organizing or cosponsoring meetings about nonprofit conversions 
 joining with other community leaders and institutions in reviewing the terms of proposed 
conversion transactions 
 reaching out to other parts of the community – such as businesses, academic institutions, 
government, and media – to strengthen and broaden participation in local service and 
consumer coalitions 
 providing funding to support the organizing, research, and action agendas of community 
coalitions formed in response to conversion proposals 
 contributing to discussions about the potential impact of proposed conversions on health 
services in the community and about community needs 
 providing perspective on the ability of the nonprofit sector to absorb costs of 
uncompensated care 
 working with regulators reviewing conversions to expand their understanding of the role 
of philanthropy and the characteristics of effective grant making  
 providing technical assistance and operating funds for local coalitions that participate in 
the operation of new conversion foundations or that address issues of health care quality 
and accessibility52 
 
                                                 
52 “Nonprofit Health Care Organization Conversions:  Participation by Philanthropic Leaders.” 
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 COMMUNITY INPUT:   
A ROLE FOR RAGS 
 
The New Mexico Association of Grantmakers (NMAG) was a key player in the conversion of 
New Mexico Blue Cross/Blue Shield.  $20 million in assets were put into a foundation to fund 
health care needs in the state.  NMAG represented the philanthropic sector in public hearings 
held by the state superintendent of insurance and the attorney general about the conversion, and 
brought together representatives of Consumer’s Union, Health Action New Mexico (an advocacy 
group), and the attorney general’s office.  Members of NMAG worked with the AG and the 
superintendent of insurance to ensure a fair valuation of the BCBS assets and helped the two 
regulators put together the Advisory and Planning Committee, which oversaw establishment of 
the foundation.   
 
---------- 
“Working Together.” 
 
“Blue Cross Blue Shield Update.” 
 
Recommendations:  Formation and Governance Issues 
 
In order to safeguard the public interest, it is essential that establishment of a conversion 
foundation incorporate a planning process that involves the perspective and expertise of local 
consumers and health care advocates; a mission statement that dedicates foundation assets to the 
purposes of the former nonprofit; a selection process that establishes the foundation’s governing 
board as separate from both the former nonprofit and the purchaser, reflects community 
diversity, and has appropriate expertise and experience; an organizational structure that is 
transparent and publicly accountable; strict term limits and strong conflict of interest policies for 
board members and other advisors; and a commitment to community health improvement. 
 
Public charities often require that a substantial majority of governing board members be “public” 
members, a requirement that conversion foundations too should write into their articles of 
incorporation.  The board should reflect community diversity in both the generally understood 
sense of racial/ethnic diversity – an area in which foundation boards are distinctly not 
representative of either the general population or the populations they serve (in 2000, foundation 
boards were 89.5% white, 6.3% black, 2.5% Hispanic, and 1.7% other, whereas 27% of the 
population is black, Hispanic, or Asian) 53 – and in the sense of people with a broad range of 
interaction with the health care system.  Board participants should therefore include local 
community members – particularly members of the populations traditionally served by the 
converted entity – health care and consumer advocates, and health care practitioners (including 
community health workers, health clinic providers, and others with strong community 
connections). 
 
Gary Yates and Thomas David of The California Wellness Foundation argue that even the term 
“conversion foundation,” suggesting as it does that these are a distinct type of foundation, is a 
problem, because referring to conversion foundations as a group “only serves to give credence to 
a mistaken belief in some circles that [they] are different from other private independent 
                                                 
53 “Foundation Boards:  Composition and Compensation”; and Gardy, p. 25. 
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 foundations.”  They note that there is no state or federal legal distinction based on whether an 
entity was created by a conversion and that in California, at least, “the conversion process 
involving health care entities is now aggressively regulated…, either by the Attorney General or 
by the Department of Corporations,” whose task is “to ensure that the charity receives fair 
market value for the assets being converted, that the transaction is fair to the charity, that there is 
no private inurement, and that certain other criteria are met depending upon the applicable statute 
and regulation.”  Use of the term, they say, only encourages the perception that conversion 
foundations’ assets are public rather than that they serve as trusts of funds dedicated to charitable 
purpose.  
 
Which is exactly right:  The public is in essence the donor of the assets in the case of a 
conversion, the foundation is a public trust, and the foundation should be structured so that the 
public has a voice in mission and governance.  Because of the high level of public scrutiny they 
rightly receive and because of the public nature of the assets with which they are established, 
conversion foundations must therefore face accountability issues head on.  If anything, they 
should be even more accountable to the public than other foundations. 
 
Most conversion foundations, as discussed above, are public charities.  While this choice may 
depend on the nature and purpose of the organization, establishment as a private foundation – 
with the stricter rules of accountability to which foundations are subject – is preferable for 
protecting the public interest for a number of reasons.   
 
 Public charities must meet the test of public support, with more than one-third of their 
annual funding coming from qualifying gifts, grants, contributions from diverse sources, 
membership fees, gross receipts from admissions, sales of merchandise, performance of 
services, or furnishing of facilities in activities related to the exempt functions.  Many 
foundations initially qualify as public charities in the period immediately following the 
conversions, but the size of their endowments makes it difficult to raise enough funds to 
meet the public-support test once the advance ruling period ends.  They also end up 
competing for funding with groups that are also trying to find resources to stay in 
existence – the very groups they could be supporting.   
 Public charities are not limited in the amount of stock they can hold in one corporation 
(as long as the public-support test is met).  Given the risk that a conversion foundation 
may be too closely associated with the for-profit parties to the transaction, the stricter rule 
applied to 501(c)(3) foundations, which are prohibited from holding more than 20% of 
the voting stock of any corporation or 20% of the profit interest in any partnership, is 
preferable.  Add to this the fact that foundations are taxed on investments that jeopardize 
their charitable purposes, and the safeguards are stronger. 
 Public charities are not subject to 5% payout rule, which ensures a minimum level of 
charitable expenditures. 
 While public charities are subject to prohibitions against private inurement and excess 
benefit to a private business, they: 
o are not subject to rules about self-dealing, which happens when people make 
improper financial gains through their ties to nonprofit groups;  
o are not subject to restrictions on outside business holdings or limits on grants to 
individuals and government officials;  
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 o do not have to pay out the minimum 5% of net assets to charities;  
o are not restricted from lobbying either directly or through grants made to 
nonprofit groups specifically for lobbying purposes; and 
o are not prohibited from making certain types of loans.54   
 
Social welfare [501(c)(4)] organizations, which constitute an increasing number of new 
conversion foundations, are even less accountable to the public than 501(c)(3) foundations.  Part 
of a broad tax category that includes political or lobbying groups like Common Cause and the 
NRA, social welfare organizations are not obliged to spend any portion of their assets on 
charitable activities and are not required to report the same detailed information as private 
foundations on their tax forms.  Until the 1996 Taxpayers Bill of Rights was enacted, federal tax 
law did not even prohibit private inurement by a c4, and there were conversion deals that 
benefited the officers, directors, and high-level executives of entities that converted.  Now no 
part of the net earnings of a social welfare organization can inure to the benefit of any private 
interest.55  
 
Even for those entities that are not incorporated as 501(c)(3) private foundations, articles of 
incorporation should be drafted to include the specific private foundation prohibitions so that 
they apply to the new entity as a matter of corporate law.   
 
Establishment of a large state foundation that accumulates the proceeds of more than one 
conversion transaction, such as the Maryland Health Care Foundation, is not a good idea, as the 
very legislature that established the foundation determined.  In the mid-1990s, a California bill to 
place the assets of all health conversion foundations into one large public foundation, which had 
been passed by the state assembly, fortunately died in the state senate.56  Conversion foundations 
should be rooted in the same community that was served by the converting organization.  In the 
case of statewide Blue Cross Blue Shield or other health plans, the foundation would of course 
serve the entire state, but more locally focused health care institutions should give rise to equally 
locally focused foundations.  Negotiation during the conversion approval process of community 
benefit plans is one essential part of ensuring that the health care needs of communities are met; 
ensuring that the conversion foundation’s mission and grant making are focused on those local 
community health care needs is the other.   
 
Recommendations:  Grant Making and Policy Issues 
 
More than 90% of all foundations make grants in health, and health-related grant making is 
second only to education-related grant making.  Much of that funding – especially the largest 
grants – is going to universities and hospitals for medical research and education.57  Some 
conversion foundations have funded programs in health services for the working poor, and 
several have created hospitals that have earmarked funds for indigent care and other services not 
offered by new for-profit hospitals.  “These investments are particularly vital to communities 
struggling to fill the gap in needed services created by the devolution of government welfare 
                                                 
54 “Federal Tax Designation for Foundations Created from Conversions,” pp. 1-3. 
55 Ibid., p. 2. 
56 Yates and David. 
57 Dowie, p. 74. 
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 programs.  Conversion foundations of all types have, in fact, played a central role in the massive 
readjustments required of state and local governments saddled with responsibilities abdicated by 
Washington.”58  But James Ferris and Elizabeth Graddy’s 2001 survey of health foundations in 
California – where more than half of all conversion assets reside – shows that: 
  
 [T]he scope of the grantmaking by the health conversion foundations is 
virtually indistinguishable from [that of] other health funders….  The 
health funding priorities, grantmaking strategies, and funding methods of 
health conversion foundations are not substantially different from other 
foundations in this study.  For example, over 50 percent of … foundations 
place priority on broad-based health programs such as health promotion 
and education, healthy families and communities, healthcare access, and 
service delivery.  Within these funding priority areas, there is an emphasis 
on program support, as opposed to core operating support, for pilot or 
established exemplary programs, and for capacity building and technical 
assistance.59
 
Because conversion foundations are part of a trend of increasingly limited access to affordable 
health care, particularly for people with already limited access, they have a special obligation to 
engage in grant making and other program activities that focus on the needs of underserved 
populations.   
 
This is not to say that they should only be in the business of direct provision of health services, 
nor should foundations encourage the public sector or other health care institutions to reduce 
their commitments to health services.  They should balance direct service needs against 
investments in prevention, public education, applied research, service evaluation, development of 
new delivery models, documentation projects, advocacy, policy development, and other 
initiatives directed at system improvement and reform.   
 
There are debates about the proper interpretation of the cy pres doctrine as it relates to 
conversion foundations, which some state regulators and advocates interpret narrowly to mean 
that assets should be used to pay for health services or to purchase insurance for the uninsured; 
others argue for broader missions that allow for programs that aim at shaping systems to be more 
responsive to community needs and to create greater access.   
 
The amount of money needed to provide all citizens with health insurance or health care services 
is enormous.  In 2000, while foundations spent an estimated $4.46 billion on health, this was 
only a tiny fraction of the more than $1.5 trillion spent annually on health services and 
programs.60  In California, public health funding exceeds $200 per person, but health 
philanthropy totals less than $10 per person.61    
 
                                                 
58 Dowie, p. 83. 
59 Ferris and Graddy, p. 20. 
60 Oliver and Gerson, p. 3. 
61 Ibid., p. 26; and Ferris and Graddy, pp. 18-19. 
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 Conversion foundations can play a role in addressing gaps in services and consider funding for 
urgent direct care needs, but they cannot and should not replace essential services and 
community benefits that should be negotiated for as part of the transaction review.  Given their 
very limited resources – a mere drop in the bucket, in fact, relative to overall health spending – 
foundations cannot begin to replace services that may be lost due to escalating health care costs, 
conversions, and other trends.   
 
And given the critical state of the country’s health care industry and the tens of millions of 
Americans with increasingly limited access to health care, conversion foundations should focus 
substantial portions of their grant making and other activities on health policy.  In this way, they 
can leverage limited resources, influence policies and programs that reach a larger population 
than can be served directly by foundation programs, bring demonstration projects to scale, 
provide resources for sustaining programs beyond short-term grant periods, and help ensure that 
government programs are effective.62   
 
Health policy-related grant making is concentrated in a small number of foundations; the top 25 
funders in the field awarded 96.8% of all health policy grants in 1995.  That year, the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation alone awarded 44.6% of all health policy grants, more than three 
times that of the second largest, The California Wellness Foundation.  The establishment of 
TCWF in fact fueled substantial growth of support for health policy activities, because the 
foundation included health policy as a central program focus; it gave more than 1/7 of all grant 
dollars in health policy in 1995.63  
 
Because of the increase in state responsibility for the nation’s health care programs, foundations 
have expanded their health policy funding to state and local activities, where their potential to 
effect change is great.  In 1995, $39.1 million (or 39%) of health policy dollars went to state and 
local programs, in contrast to only $6.4 million (or 21%) of health policy dollars in 1990.  And 
40% of health policy grant dollars in 1995 were for particular population groups such as children 
and youth and ethnic and racial minorities.64   
 
Conversion foundations should focus in particular on the insurance crisis being faced by 43.6 
million Americans, through efforts aimed at improving employer-sponsored coverage, bolstering 
public programs such as Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, and 
developing initiatives to provide coverage for individuals who do not qualify for employer-
sponsored or public programs.  Insurance coverage is a critical step in assuring equitable access 
to health services; being uninsured reduces use of medical care by as much as 50%.  The 
uninsured make fewer visits to the doctor, use emergency room care more frequently, are more 
often hospitalized for chronic conditions than their insured counterparts.  They are several times 
more likely to lack a regular source of care, to delay or not receive needed care, and to fail to fill 
prescriptions because of the cost.  They are less likely to report that they are in excellent or very 
good health, and more likely report that their health is only good, fair, or poor.  The uninsured 
tend to have later intervention and poorer outcomes from diseases such as cancer, cardiovascular 
                                                 
62 “Strategies for Shaping Public Policy:  A Guide for Health Funders,” p. 1. 
63 Oliver and Gerson, p. 3.  
64 Ibid., p. 4. 
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 disease, and diabetes; babies born to uninsured mothers have lower survival rates; and 
individuals who are uninsured for long periods of time have significantly higher risks of dying.65   
 
Local foundations should respond to local events and practice locally strategic philanthropy that 
includes influencing public agendas and policies.  Most conversion foundations do make grants 
in a limited geographic area, where they have the greatest potential to effect change at the state 
and local levels.  They are often the largest source of nongovernmental health funding in a 
community or state; in Tennessee, for example, the largest and second-largest foundations in the 
state were created through conversions  
 
At the same time, the need for new national policies that ensure greater, not less, access to health 
care for Americans is great.  Conversion foundations, as new and disparate as they are, as locally 
focused as they are, and as unsettled as the field is, are a long way from being able to work 
together and with other foundations to effect policy change at the national level.  But even as 
they find their way, they can and should begin to point the way and to work with other 
conversion foundations, advocates for the underserved and consumers, traditional philanthropy, 
and policy makers to change the systems under which we currently operate – systems that are not 
working. 
 
In the first century of American health philanthropy almost everything was 
tried and funded.  Only two areas have remained unchallenged by 
foundations.  One is the preeminent role of hospitals in health care; the 
other is the resistance to a single-payer health care system or national 
health plan.  While every other country in the developed world has found 
ways to assure some health care to most of its citizens, about 44 million 
Americans remain uncovered, languishing helplessly between the 
extremely poor and aged who are covered by Medicare and Medicaid and 
those who are either employed with generous benefits or affluent enough 
to buy their own costly health insurance….  To some degree this situation 
is a result of actions taken by American foundations – not because they 
have aggressively opposed a national health plan but because their funding 
of systems research and the development of health care delivery models 
quite deliberately excludes anything that sounds like socialized 
medicine.66
 
                                                 
65 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
66 Dowie, p. 76. 
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